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approach to interpret the word sex under a modern lens. Justice Gorsuch rejected the idea of original
intent, claiming that only Article VII’s literal words matter in its interpretation. Justice Kavanagh took issue
with this, representing the age-old ideological debate of legislating from the bench.
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Abstract
LGBT rights in the United States have come a long way in the past
few decades. Cases such as Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell v.
Hodges have shown the critical role of the Supreme Court in
attaining equality for LGBT people. Bostock v. Clayton County is
the latest case of this kind. Bostock firmly established that
workplace discrimination based on gay or transgender status was
forbidden under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This
essay examines the case’s majority opinion—written by
conservative Justice Gorsuch—and Justice Kavanagh’s dissent. It
establishes that Justice Gorsuch used a living textualism approach
to interpret the word sex under a modern lens. Justice Gorsuch
rejected the idea of original intent, claiming that only Article VII’s
literal words matter in its interpretation. Justice Kavanagh took
issue with this, representing the age-old ideological debate of
legislating from the bench.
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Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
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Introduction
The last few decades have seen incredible advancement
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights in the
United States. On the federal judiciary level, several cases have
been instrumental in developing LGBT rights. The first major
case of its kind was Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which repealed
individual state sodomy laws banning same-sex intercourse. The
case reversed Bowers v. Hardwick (1982), which had upheld
Georgia’s sodomy laws and served to legally tie “sodomy” —then
meaning non-procreative sexual behavior—purely to homosexual
sex (Burgess, 2006). Using the judgment of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey (1992), the Lawrence verdict also claimed that the core
of liberty is a person's ability and privacy in deciding their
personal lives, including their choices regarding consensual
sexual encounters. The Court further supported the claim by
noting that sociological and psychological research had shown no
inherent harm caused by simply being homosexual (Spindelman,
2004). The case was a significant victory for divorced gay parents,
as sodomy laws could no longer be used to undermine them in
custody hearings (Naeger, 2004). A little over a decade later,
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) settled the debate over same-sex
marriage raging throughout the American states by reestablishing
marriage as a civil right and declaring laws banning or restricting
same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The written majority opinion
was particularly noteworthy for its poetic phrasing, invoking the
spirit of love and romance deemed inherent to same-sex marriage.
Not only was the case a glowing ray of legal support for same-sex
couples, but it also helped legitimize it in a moral and emotional
way (Walker, 2020).
As legal support and legitimacy grew for LGBT rights,
public opinion continued to shift towards its support. A 2014 study
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by Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert studied the effects of the
legalization of same-sex marriage on public opinion of LGBT
issues. The study found that citizens in Iowa were more likely to
support LGBT rights after the legalization of same-sex marriage
by the Iowa Supreme Court, even if they had not previously
supported it. They concluded that their data supported the
existence of a feedback loop in moral policy—especially for
policies that legitimize a minority group—due to a perception of
judicial legitimacy. Another study by Rhodebeck, Gainous, and
Gray (2014) found that while popular morality politics were
generally influenced by political elites, those elites were subject
to political morality changes themselves if they saw their
constituency move towards the other side of an issue. An example
of this would be former President Barack Obama, who claimed to
oppose same-sex marriage in his 2008 Presidential campaign
before changing his official stance shortly after due to public
opinion regarding LGBT rights. During his presidency, Obama
would repeal the discriminatory Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell military
policy and ban LGBT discrimination for employees working
federal contracts (Steinmetz, 2015). These studies, in conjunction,
show that legal rulings, like Obergefell, have a substantial effect
on voting and public policies beyond their immediate effects.
In 2020, the next landmark Supreme Court case involving
LGBT rights surrounded Article VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Civil Rights Act was passed by Congress with the
principal goal of banning private discrimination based on race.
Ironically, southern conservatives were the ones to introduce sex
discrimination in the bill, hoping to crush its support in Congress
by playing on congressional misogyny (Barzilay, 2016).
However, due to the efforts of several American feminist
movements, the bill passed with the added sections. As a result,
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned all workplace discrimination
“because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin” (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1964, p. 13).
This brings us to the subject of this paper: the 2020
Supreme Court case Bostock v. Clayton County. In 2013, Gerald
Lyn Bostock, a gay man, was fired from his job as a child welfare
advocate in Clayton County, Georgia, for “unbecoming” conduct.
Prior to his firing, Bostock had received several favorable
performance reviews and excellence awards. He alleged his firing
was “unwarranted and prompted due to his sexual orientation and
failure to conform to gender stereotypes” (Carter, 2020, p. 61). He
also claimed that the catalyst for this discrimination was his
joining of an all-gay softball team —which publicly affirmed his
sexuality—and that his participation on the team was mentioned
negatively during meetings with the Friends of Clayton County
CASA Advisory Board. The case was argued in front of the
United States Supreme Court in 2020. The Court sided with
Bostock, claiming that discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity was prohibited by Article VII of the Civil
Rights Act (Carter, 2020). This paper examines Bostock v.
Clayton County’s majority opinion and Kavanagh’s dissenting
opinion in order to argue that the case was not an overexertion of
the Supreme Court’s judiciary power.
Living Textualism
The Supreme Court usually follows one of two
interpretations of the law: original intent and living document.
Traditionally adhered to by conservative judges, the doctrine of
original intent refers to the judicial idea that laws and documents
should be followed as they were intended by their original writers.
Liberal judges are more likely to follow the living document
doctrine. The antithesis of the doctrine of original intent, a living
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document, is based on the idea that a document changes over time
and must be interpreted and upheld through a modern lens. When
looking at a legal document—like the U.S. Constitution or the
Civil Rights Act of 1964—judges should apply a modern reading
to the law and “modify or ignore those portions that are not
[modern enough]” (McConnel, 1997, p. 1128). However, another
popular legal theory called the living document doctrine can
create issues in statutory cases. This is because laws interpreted
by the Supreme Court are relatively recent and cannot be
interpreted too loosely. Many believe that original intent should
be adhered to in statutory cases for this exact reason.
Critics of the Bostock v. Clayton County take issue with
the majority’s interpretation of the law—specifically Justice
Gorsuch’s definition of “sex”—as they do not coincide with the
original intent. They believe that the Supreme Court unjustly
placed current politics over the true intentions of the 1964
Congress (Lund, 2020). Justice Gorsuch admits that the majority
of lawmakers who passed the Civil Rights Act “might not have
anticipated their work would lead to this particular result”
(Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020). This is indeed a sensible
deduction. At the time, the LGBT civil rights movement was
small and decentralized. While LGBT rights groups existed, they
focused on individual cases of discrimination rather than legal and
social discrimination as a whole. In fact, the crux of the twentiethcentury queer rights movement would occur later in the decade
with the Compton’s Cafeteria Riot in 1966 and the Stonewall
Riots—which brought national attention to LGBT
discrimination—in 1969 (Stryker, 2017).
However, while it is undeniable that LGBT rights were
not the motivation behind the creation of Title VII, Justice
Gorsuch did not find this to matter. The Supreme Court Justice
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wrote that “only the written word is the law, and all persons are
entitled to its benefit” (Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020). By
stating this, he “utilized the principles of textualism” as he “relied
on the ordinary public meaning of the statute and refused to
consider extratextual sources” (Capparelli, 2021, p. 1421). This is
the exact opposite of the doctrine of original intent, which shows
that the Supreme Court’s majority was purposely rejecting that
particular judicial interpretation.
Since the Supreme Court rejected original intent in their
opinion, one would assume that they used the living document
doctrine instead. However, they did not. Instead, Justice Gorsuch
applied a third interpretation: living textualism. A spiritual sibling
to living document, living textualism uses the same form of
reasoning—the law must be interpreted through a modern lens—
but does this through the interpretation of the literal text. In this
view, the actual text is the most important part of the law and must
be examined thoroughly. However, the text is subject to
interpretation, one that changes drastically over time (Lund,
2020).
A Summary of Sex in the Majority
Bostock’s majority opinion hinges on the definition of the
term sex in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The majority
opinion was written by conservative Justice Gorsuch – adhering
to the Court’s tradition of having the ideological opposition write
the opinion to further the ruling’s legitimacy. Justice Gorsuch
decided to focus entirely on the word sex as used in the phrase
“because of … sex” as he considered it the most important part of
Title VII. Like many phrases and terms used in laws and Supreme
Court cases, the word sex was surprisingly ambiguous. The Court
had to decide whether discrimination based on sexuality was
synonymous with discrimination based on sex. The Court decided
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that Clayton County’s actions were in violation of Title VII
(Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020).
This ruling broadened the definition of sex-based
discrimination to include all discrimination remotely related to a
person’s sex. Justice Gorsuch wrote that “an employer who fires
an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that
person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in
members of a different sex” (Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020, p.
2). This ties into the very definition of homosexuality, which is an
attraction to someone of the same sex. In cases of discrimination
against LGB people, what matters entirely is their sex. It is what
dictates the sex of a traditionally “proper” sexual and romantic
partner. The main difference between a homosexual man and a
heterosexual woman is their sexes. A woman would not be
discriminated against for being attracted to a man because they
are of opposite sexes; meanwhile, were a man to feel attraction to
the exact same man, he would be discriminated against. This same
logic can also be applied to bisexual and pansexual individuals, as
their attraction to genders and sexes, other than theirs, defines
their sexualities. In the case of Bostock, had he been a woman
openly attracted to men, he would not have gotten fired for being
gay. The same logic can be applied to a transgender individual.
Someone who is transgender is someone who does not identify
with the gender placed upon them due to their biological sex. If
an individual is born with the male sex but identifies as a woman,
then they are rejecting their biological sex. The main difference
between a trans woman and a cisgender woman is the assigned
sex with which they were born. If the trans woman is
discriminated against, but the cisgender woman is not, that is
because of sex (Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020). The use of the
word sex in both definitions and explanations show how integral
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sex is in defining these identities, as well as who does and does
not get discriminated against.
A Summary of Particular Circumstances
Because of Title VII’s otherwise straightforward
structure, particularly the phrase “because of sex,” any
discrimination based around sex is rendered illegal. Therefore,
with this new definition by the Supreme Court, any discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity is banned by
federal law. Furthermore, as an employee’s gay or transgender
status is wholly unrelated to non-discriminatory employment
decisions, they cannot logically and legally be taken into account.
To highlight this, the majority opinion responds to certain
instances brought up by Clayton County. For example, it does not
matter if an employer treats an employee differently because of
discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, as those unlawful
reasons are still present and makes the treatment unlawful.
“Unintentional” discrimination is also no excuse for employers
because Title VII bans “discrimination against individuals, not
groups” (Bostock v. Clayton County, 2020, p. 8). Asking an
employee or applicant to disclose their sexuality or transgender
status is also banned, as both the employer and the individual must
not consider sex when asking or answering professional questions
(Bostock v. Clayton County).
Justice Kavanaugh and Legislating From the Bench
Justice Kavanagh’s dissent revolved around his belief that
Bostock’s precedent is too extreme a departure from previous
rulings and surpassed the political powers of the Supreme Court.
This is part of a much larger debate surrounding the idea of
legislating from the bench. In order to understand this debate, it is
important to note the Supreme Court’s role in the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the
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country and presides over all other courts with supreme judicial
power. The most important part of Article III – the part of the U.S.
Constitution that establishes the Supreme Court – is the fact that
that power “shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under … the laws of the United States” (U.S. Const. Art. III, §. 2).
Therefore, we have statutory cases such as Bostock, which
interprets a law passed by Congress. This is, at its core, a check
for Congressional power. But can Congress go too far? The
Constitution gives no answer. In fact, other than that phrase and a
few other details, Article III is frustratingly vague. “Legislating
from the bench” refers to the idea that a Justice or Court decision
has surpassed the limits of Article III and is acting as a legislator,
which according to Article I, means that they are creating a law or
amending one much too drastically. However, Justice Gorsuch
justifies his use of living textualism for this very reason. He writes
that “only the words on the page constitute the law adopted by
Congress and approved by the President” (Bostock v. Clayton
County, 2020, p. 4); therefore, looking at anything other than the
actual law would be doing the work of a legislator. For him,
changing the actual text constitutes legislating from the bench.
Because the extent of the Supreme Court’s power over the
legislature is vague and up to personal interpretation, Justice
Gorsuch’s understanding of the idea is perfectly valid. And in his
framing of the majority opinion, he is not legislating from the
bench.
Furthermore, Bostock v. Clayton County is the result of
decades of legal precedents as the Supreme Court had begun
interpreting Title VII in a more liberal manner decades prior. In
one of the first cases, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), the
Supreme Court found that sexual harassment in the workplace
was a subsection of sex discrimination and was therefore
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forbidden. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998)
then established that same-sex harassment and discrimination
were also covered by Title VII, stating that while Congress likely
did not intend to cover this phenomenon under Title VII,
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils” (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 1998, p. 79). Later, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
(1989) set the precedent that Title VII banned discrimination
based on sex stereotypes. This interpretation meant that the
perception of a person’s sex—rather than just their actual sex—
was forbidden under Title VII. So, Bostock was far from the first
case to look at Title VII from a liberal perspective. The question
posed in Bostock—whether discrimination based on sexuality
violated Title VII—had also already been asked in lower United
States courts. Multiple courts interpreted Title VII according to
the Supreme Court’s logic in Waterhouse: LGBT employees were
protected under Title VII. The sixth circuit court ruled in Barnes
v. City of Cincinnati (2005) and Smith v. City of Salem (2004) that
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity
were based on gender stereotypes and forbidden under the
Waterhouse precedent. In Senegal v. Yum! Brands Inc. (2019), the
fifth circuit ruled in favor of a gay employee using Waterhouse’s
precedent as well (Valenti, 2020), although they refused to go
further than the idea that homophobia is due to sex stereotyping.
Ultimately, if Congress does find issue with this
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act, it can always reverse the
precedent by way of legislature. This has happened many times in
American history, and one notable instance also had to do with
Title VII. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (1998)
focused on a very specific procedural detail in the upholding of
Title VII. In the case, Lilly Ledbetter was refused a raise and given
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consistently low rankings when working for Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. —leading to a lower pay rate than her male
coworkers—which she alleged was a direct result of sex-based
discrimination and for which she filed a formal EEOC charge for
disparate pay. The Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff could not
bring forward a suit under Title VII if the results of the
discriminatory action (in this case disparate pay) occurred during
the Act's 180-day statutory limitations period, but the action itself
occurred outside of the 180 days. Congress disagreed with this
interpretation and passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009,
reversing the Ledbetter precedent (Zisk, 2009). The same could
still happen with Bostock v. Clayton County if Congress takes as
much issue with the ruling as Justice Kavanagh.
Conclusion
Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) was a significant
victory for LGBT rights. The case set the precedent that LGBT
employees were protected from discrimination by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch
reasoned that while the 1964 Congress did not intend to protect
LGBT people when passing the law, it must be interpreted based
on its text alone. He applied a modern understanding of the term
sex in order to extend its understanding beyond the male and
female sexes. This reasoning was in line with previous Supreme
Court—notably Waterhouse—and several interpretations by
lower courts. Justice Kavanagh’s dissenting opinion claimed that
the Supreme Court had gone too far with this verdict and was
doing the work of the legislature rather than the judiciary.
However, the Supreme Court was justified in this ruling and
interpretation of Title VII because it was based on the literal word
of law and coincided with previous interpretations of Title VII.
Additionally, if Congress truly believes Title VII has been
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misinterpreted, it can nullify the precedent as it did with Ledbetter.
Bostock shows how nuanced American laws can truly be.
Even a phrase as short and simple as “because of sex” can have
varying legal interpretations and consequences. It also shows how
the makeup of the Supreme Court can have a drastic effect on how
the law is applied, especially in minority rights cases. With the
confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett later that year, Bostock
would not have been interpreted the way that it was had it been
argued a few months after. Barrett’s confirmation also places
Bostock’s ruling at risk as the Supreme Court has the conservative
supermajority to reverse the precedent. While it is highly unlikely
that the Supreme Court will overturn one of its own decisions so
soon after making it, Congress should be ready to protect its
LGBT constituents if this occurs.
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